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If it’s not “broke,” don’t fix it—or maybe do. In the realm of 
property insurance, standard replacement-cost policy language is being 
hotly contested, leaving many insureds wondering what their property 
insurance policies actually cover. The policy itself reads that the 
insurer will cover “direct physical loss to covered property,” and yet, 
debate over the interpretation of this simple sentence has reached the 
Seventh Circuit. In cases of partial property damage, insurers seek to 
pay to replace only what they must—the damaged property and 
nothing more. Insureds, however, fear such replacements will leave 
them with property that is aesthetically mismatched, as the brand-new 
materials amid undamaged, older materials might cause their property 
to decrease in value. However, remedying this concern is no small 
matter: the price of beauty can cost insurers with this particular 
replacement-cost policy language millions more than perhaps what 
they originally bargained for.1 The question then remains—should 
                                                 
*J.D. candidate, May 2020, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A. Communications, Moody Bible Institute, May 2016.  
1 According to a March 2019 analysis by State Farm, damage caused by wind 
and hailstorms “cost State Farm and its policyholders more than $2.7 billion in 
2018,” and “Colorado was the state with the most wind/hail losses, followed by 
1
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such a property insurer be required to replace undamaged property in 
order to achieve aesthetic “matching”? The Seventh Circuit’s recent 
opinion in Windridge of Naperville Condominium Association v. 
Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company2 answered this question 
in favor of coverage for the insured.   
On May 20, 2014, a strong hail and wind storm greatly damaged 
buildings owned by Windridge of Naperville Condominium 
Association (“Windridge”).3 Specifically, the storm directly damaged 
the aluminum siding on the south and west sides of Windridge’s 
buildings, equating to a multi-million dollar loss.4 Windridge filed a 
claim with its insurer, Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company 
(“PIIC”), for payment to replace the aluminum siding on all sides of 
its storm-affected buildings covered by the policy.5 PIIC only agreed 
to pay for the replacement of the damaged aluminum siding on the 
south and west sides of the buildings, but not the undamaged siding on 
the north and east sides.6 According to PIIC, the relevant insurance 
policy only required payment for “direct physical loss to covered 
property,” and the siding on the north and east sides did not experience 
any such loss or damage.7 Windridge argued that its current aluminum 
siding was no longer available, and thus, any replacement siding 
would not match the undamaged siding.8 Additionally, Windridge 
                                                                                                                   
Texas, Illinois, Minnesota and Missouri.” INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, 
iii.org/fact-statistic/facts-statistics-hail. 
2
 Windridge of Naperville Condo. Ass’n v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. (“Windridge 
II”), 932 F.3d 1035, 1036 (7th Cir. 2019). 
3
 Id.  
4
 Id. Although the insurer, Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company, agreed 
to pay $2.1 million to Windridge for the damage to the south and west sides, 
Windridge sought approximately $3.5 million in replacement costs for the siding of 
all four sides of all buildings in their entirety. See Brief for Defendant-Appellant 
(“PIIC Brief”) at 8, Windridge of Naperville Condo. Ass’n v. Philadelphia Indem. 
Ins.Co., No. 1:18-cv-2103 (7th Cir. Nov. 15, 2018).  
5
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claimed that buildings with two elevations consisting of replacement 
siding and two elevations consisting of undamaged siding would result 
in a mismatched appearance that would not make it “whole.”9 
One interpretation of Windridge’s replacement-cost policy might 
suggest that PIIC must pay to replace only the specific panels of siding 
that were damaged, while another interpretation might suggest that 
PIIC must pay to replace all of the siding on the affected buildings in 
order to restore the buildings’ uniform appearance.10 Yet another 
interpretation might suggest that PIIC pay to replace the siding on the 
buildings’ affected sides, each side being considered separately for 
damage.11 Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the Northern 
District of Illinois’s decision, which interpreted the policy as covering 
replacement siding on all four sides of all the buildings.12  
Part I of this note explores the construction of general 
replacement-cost policy language and the effect of its often-
overwhelming ambiguity. Part II of this note provides an overview of 
the Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in Windridge of Naperville 
Condominium Association v. Philadelphia Insurance Company, 
highlighting its analysis of the particular replacement-cost policy 
language at issue. Part III analyzes other courts’ approaches in 
interpreting similar replacement-cost policy language, evaluating the 
strengths and weaknesses of those arguments. Finally, part IV 
examines the impact that the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Windridge 












 Id. at 1040. 
11
 Id. 
12 Id. at 1036. 
3
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PART I: BACKGROUND 
 
 Replacement Cost Policy Construction 
 
About 70 million people have homeowner’s insurance.13 Common 
to most property insurance policies is compensation for “actual cash 
value” of damaged property.14 Actual cash value allows the insured to 
be compensated for the property value lost.15 In Illinois, actual cash 
value is measured by the property’s replacement value minus any 
depreciation,16 which accounts for wear and tear costs.17 Because 
                                                 
13 Claire Wilkinson, How Many Homes are Insured? How Many are 
Uninsured? TERMS + CONDITIONS: INS. INDUSTRY BLOG (October 17, 2019), http:// 
www.iii.org/insuranceindustryblog/?p=4339. 
14
 Randy R. Koenders, Annotation, Construction and Effect of Property 
Insurance Provision Permitting Recovery of Replacement Cost of Property, 1 
A.L.R.5th 817 (1992). 
15 As one commentator has noted, “[a]lthough the term actual cash value is 
found in many property insurance policies,” and the “generally-accepted meaning of 
the term” is replacement cost less depreciation, “it is quite common for the phrase 
not to be defined in [property insurance] policies.” Johnny Parker, Replacement Cost 
Coverage: A Legal Primer, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 295, 332 n.5 (1999). 
16
 Depreciation in the insurance context refers to a decrease in the value of the 
property based on factors such as age, condition, and usefulness. See Depreciation, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).  
17 Carey v. Am. Family Brokerage, Inc., 391 Ill. App. 3d 273, 281 (1st Dist. 
2009) (in Illinois, “in arriving at ‘actual cash value’ a deduction must be made from 
replacement cost to account for depreciation . . .”). Outside of Illinois, such as in 
Iowa, actual cash value is interpreted as being “fair market value.” See Gustafson v. 
Cent. Iowa Mut. Ins. Ass’n., 277 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa 1979). In other states, such 
as New York, actual cash value is interpreted under the “broad evidence rule,” which 
essentially allows the trier of fact to consider market value of the property at the time 
of the loss; however, Illinois rejects both the “fair market value” and “broad 
evidence rule” approaches to interpreting actual cash value. See Carey, 391 Ill. App. 
3d at 281 (“Illinois courts have rejected both the ‘market value’ and the ‘broad 
evidence’ tests, instead applying the aforementioned ‘replacement cost less 
depreciation’ test in determining the actual cash value of damaged property.”); see 
also C.L. Maddox, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co., 208 Ill. App. 3d 1042, 1055 (5th Dist. 
1991) (“While we are aware that other States have adopted a ‘broad evidence’ rule 
4
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actual cash value causes the insured to bear the loss of depreciation, 
replacement-cost coverage was created to alleviate this problem.18 
Replacement-cost coverage allows “recovery for the actual value of 
the property at the time of loss, without deduction for deterioration, 
obsolescence, and similar depreciation of the property’s value.”19 In 
other words, replacement-cost provisions allow the insured to receive 
an amount equal to that which would be required to replace the lost 
items.20 Similar to actual cash value, replacement-cost coverage will 
apply after a certain deductible is met.21 Although policy language 
may provide otherwise, most insurance policies only allow claims for 
actual cash value until repairs to the damaged property are made, at 
which point insurers will accept claims for replacement-cost value.22 
For example, consider the insured who gets a roof that costs him 
$10,000. Let us assume the insured has a $1,000 deductible and that 
every year the roof depreciates in value about $1,000. After 5 years, a 
hailstorm damages the insured’s roof. Using actual cash value, 
because the roof is 5 years old, it is now only worth $5,000, and after 
paying the deductible, the insured is out about $6,000. However, under 
replacement-cost coverage, assuming the insured’s met his deductible, 
the insured could recover the cost to build a new roof of similar 
quality to the $10,000 roof. This approach only leaves the insured out 
$1,000. 
                                                                                                                   
which would permit the introduction of market value evidence, we decline to adopt 
such a rule.”) (internal citations omitted). 
18 See generally, Am. Jur. 2d, Insurance § 1661. 
19
 Koenders, supra note 14 at pin cite. (emphasis added). 
20
 As an example of the different amounts that can be found using different 
valuation methods, Windridge’s supporting memorandum shows an appraisal award 
for $2,940,000.00 for replacement-cost value of the siding as opposed to of 
$2,352,005.92 for actual cash value of the siding. Plaintiff-Appellee’s Suppl. 
Memo.at  4,Windridge of Naperville Condo. Ass’n v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., No. 18-
2103 (7th Cir. April 3, 2019), ECF No. 44.  
21
 See Koenders, supra note 14 at *7. 
22
 But see Nicastro v. New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 148 A.D.3d 1737, 
1738 (4th Dep’t 2017) (finding that language regarding the timing of bringing 
replacement claims ambiguous because the policy failed to define the term “claim”). 
5
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Ironically, “[t]he difference between ‘replacement cost’ and 
‘actual cash value’ may be one of the few aspects of property 
insurance coverage that is actually explained to consumers by 
insurance agents.”23 Although as a general matter replacement-cost 
policies seem to provide better coverage, the insured’s premiums are 
often higher,24 the policy generally requires a homeowner to insure at 
least 80% of the actual replacement cost of their home before getting a 
replacement cost settlement,25 and getting the insurer to actually pay to 
replace damaged property is a process within itself.26  
One issue involving replacement-cost policies is the timing of the 
replacement.27 Some replacement-cost policies contain provisions that 
require the insured to “‘commence’ repair or replacement  of the 
insured property within a certain timeframe [and] will generally be 
upheld although it will not be interpreted as requiring that the repairs 
be completed within that timeframe.”28 Other policies only require that 
repairs or replacements be done in a “reasonable” amount of time.29 
Typically, the policy will have a provision stating that the insurer is 
not liable for more than actual cash value of the damaged property 
until the repair or replacement has taken place.30 Additionally, the 
policy may include a provision that allows the insured the option to 
                                                 
23 Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1263, 1274 n.39 (2011). 
24
 See Alessi v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 464 S.W.3d 529, 532 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2015).  
25 See e.g., Bardi v. Farmers Fire Ins. Co., 687 N.Y.S.2d 768, 771 (App. Div. 
1999). 
26
 See generally Koenders, supra note 14 (“Matching issues are frequently 
problematic . . . .”). 
27
 2 JAMES L. KNOLL, INSURING REAL PROPERTY § 25.04 (LexisNexis Matthew 
Bender 2019). 
28
 Id. (emphasis added).  
29
 Id. 
30 See Tamco Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 216 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Ill. 1963) 
(recognizing that the endorsement policy language— “any loss unless and until the 
damaged or destroyed property is actually repaired”— had to be met before the 
insurer was liable for any loss). 
6
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collect the actual cash value of the damaged property in exchange for 
foregoing her right to later make a claim for replacement costs.31 “Due 
diligence” in completing repairs is usually required, which has been 
interpreted to cover periods anywhere from ten months to a full year.32 
Another issue regarding replacement-cost policies that continues 
to occur involves properly determining the scope of coverage, 
particularly when there is only partial damage to property. In Illinois, 
the insured has the initial burden to prove that the loss is covered, and 
then the insurer will have the burden to combat such argument by 
asserting that a limitation or exclusion in the policy applies.33  
Even as far back as 1983 in Mastin v. Sandy & Beaver Ins. Co., 
the issue regarding scope of coverage was prevalent.34 In Mastin, the 
insured’s home was damaged by a storm, which was a covered hazard 
under the policy, and it was necessary to cut a hole in the kitchen floor 
to repair the damage done to the plumbing.35 After the other repairs 
were made, the insurer only paid to patch the kitchen floor, and the 
insured wanted the entire kitchen floor replaced.36 The court found 
that the floor could not be “repaired” if such an obvious patch was left, 
and therefore, replacement was necessary.37 In its reasoning, the court 
                                                 
31
 See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v Hartford Fire Ins. Co., No. 78C 3576, 1979 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7969, *4-5 (December 14, 1979) (applying Illinois law) 
(a replacement-cost policy indicated that if the full cost of repair was more than 
$1,000 or more than 5 percent of the total amount of insurance covering the damaged 
property, the insurer was not liable until the actual repair work was completed; 
however, the insured’s decision to disregard this election would not affect the 
insured’s right to make a further claim within 180 days after the loss because the 
court viewed the insurer as bearing the risk of increased construction costs, including 
increased costs accruing during litigation concerning the meaning of that provision). 
32
 Koenders, supra note 14, at *2a, *3. 
33
 Addison Ins. Co. v. Fay, 232 Ill.2d 446, 453 (2009) (stating that “the burden 
in on the insured to prove that its claim falls within the coverage of an insurance 
policy” and “[o]nce the insured has demonstrated coverage, the burden then shifts to 
the insurer to prove a limitation or exclusion applies.”).  
34
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placed emphasis on the fact that the insurer presumably inspected the 
kitchen floor, was aware that the access to the plumbing was through 
the kitchen floor, and knew the kitchen floor might be expensive to 
replace.38  
Other courts have distinguished Mastin where damage can be 
limited to occurring to only a particular area.39 In St. Paul Fire & 
Marine Co. v. Darlak Motor Inns, Inc., an insured had six hotel rooms 
damaged as a result of a fire.40 The insured wanted its insurer to cover 
the cost of redecorating rooms on the third floor, which were 
undamaged by the fire, in order for all its rooms to maintain 
“continuous décor.”41 The court determined that in this case, the 
insurer was not merely “patching” a problem in a deficient manner, 
but rather “would have no reason to know that it would have to 
redecorate every room on a floor even if only one of those rooms was 
damaged.”42 Therefore, the cost of requiring the insurer to redecorate 
those undamaged rooms was unwarranted.43 
As these case examples demonstrate, replacement-cost policies 
can be unclear when partial damage to property occurs and the parties 
are determining how much property to replace. To eliminate 
unexpected costs, insurers, much like PIIC in Windridge, include a 
valuation provision that allows them to choose the least expensive 
replacement option.44 For example, in Windridge, PIIC agreed to “pay 
for direct physical ‘loss’ to Covered Property caused by or resulting 
from any of the Covered Causes of Loss” and included the following 
valuation provision:45 




 St. Paul Fire & Marine Co v. Darlak Motor Inns, Inc., No. 3:97-cv-1559, 




 Id. at *17. 
42
 Id. at *20. 
43
 Id. at *22. 
44
 Windridge of Naperville Condo. Ass’n v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. (“Windridge 
II”), 932 F.3d 1035, 1036-37 (7th Cir. 2019). 
45
 Note that all words or phrases that begin with a capital letter generally 
indicate that such word or phrase is defined in the insurance policy itself. 
8
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 We will determine the value of Covered Property 
in the event of “loss” as follows: 
a. at replacement cost (without deduction for 
depreciation) as of the time of “loss” . . . 
1. We will not pay more for “loss” on 
replacement costs basis than the least of: 
a) The Limit of Insurance applicable to 
the lost or damaged property; 
b) The cost to replace the lost or 
damaged property with other 
property: 
i. Of comparable material and 
quality; and 
ii. Used for the same purpose; 
or 
c) The amount you actually spend that 
is necessary to repair or replace the 
lost damaged property.46 
 
Based on the policy language cited, PIIC agreed to either replace or 
pay to replace the covered property that was damaged by a covered 
loss, depending on which option was cheaper.  
Additionally, as is typical of most replacement-cost policies, a 
loss payment provision is also included.47 Property insurance policies 
generally include loss payment provisions to allow the insurer some 
flexibility and discretion in the process of compensating the insured 
for his loss. Using Windridge’s policy as an example, the loss payment 
provision allowed PIIC to choose the least expensive of the following 
four options: (1) pay the value of the damaged property; (2) pay the 
cost to repair or replace the damaged property; (3) take all or any part 
                                                 
46
 Windridge II, 932 F.3d at 1037. 
47
 See id. 
9
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of the property at an agreed or appraised value; or (4) repair, rebuild, 
or replace the property with other property of like kind and quality.48  
Although option 4—which will repair, rebuild, or replace the 
property—is the only option that specifically uses the (words “like 
kind and quality,” the Seventh Circuit indicated, the phrase “[o]f 
comparable material and quality” was applicable to all the loss 
payment provision options.49 The Seventh Circuit recognized that 
“regardless of which option Philadelphia Indemnity [chose], 
replacement property must be “[o]f comparable material and quality” 
and PIIC indicated as much in their valuation statement.50  
Option 2, which commonly or usually requires payment for 
replacement of the property, is the cheapest option for insurers.51 
However, problems arise when computing the replacement cost 
amount when, as was the case in Windridge, materials go out of stock 
and become unavailable, leaving no exact or identical match on the 
market.52 Such issues have left the parties wondering how identical of 
a match is required.   
Many courts have determined that although an exact match may 
not be required, a “reasonable” match is required.53 Courts around the 
country tend to vary in defining a reasonable match, but typically the 
definition involves replacement that is equal in value and virtually 
identical to the undamaged property.54 In Cedar Bluff Townhome 








 Id.; It is, in fact, rare for insurance companies to ever want to choose an 
option like (3) or (4) in the policy in Windridge, as these steps essentially turn the 
policy into a contract for repair and exposes them to potential liability to others. See 
12A STEVEN PLITT, ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE §176:41 (3d. ed. 2019). 
52
 See id. at 1037. 
53
 See Cedar Bluff Townhome Condo. Ass’n v. Am. Family Mut. Inc. Co., 857 
N.W.2d 290 (Minn. 2014). 
54 See, e.g., Alessi v. Mid-Century Ins. Co, 464 S.W.3d 529, 532-33 (Mo. Ct. 
App. June 23, 2015) (“Considering the definition in full, construed in favor of the 
insured to provide the broadest coverage possible, ‘equivalent’ requires that the 
replacement [siding] be ‘equal in value’ and ‘virtually identical’”); Hamlet Condo. 
10
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Condominium Ass’n v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., over 20 
buildings were lightly affected by a hail storm, each building 
experiencing damage to less than 2% of its siding.55 Like in 
Windridge, the insured in Cedar Bluff claimed that, pursuant to their 
replacement cost policy, the insurer should pay to replace the siding on 
all four sides of each of their twenty buildings because the current 
siding was eleven years old, faded, and would not match any brand 
new siding that would replace the damaged panels.56 Interestingly, 
while the manufacturer of the insured’s buildings’ siding still made the 
same exact siding, the insured argued that such brand new panels 
would not match the color of the faded siding.57 The Minnesota 
Supreme Court found that the insurer agreed to replace the panels with 
“comparable material and quality,” and such a phrase included color 
concerns.58 Further, the court held the insurer had to replace the siding 
on all twenty buildings to avoid the color mismatch.59 
Minnesota is not alone in concluding that replacement-cost 
provisions (like in Cedar Bluff) do, in fact, require more than paying 
for a merely similar match.60 In Alessi v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., a 
hailstorm damaged the siding on the insured’s house’s north side.61 
Once again, the insured argued that the siding was no longer available 
and the insurer was required to recover for the cost of siding on the 
entire house.62 The Appellate Court agreed with the insured and 
                                                                                                                   
Ass’n v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2016-cv-305942017, Colo. Dist. LEXIS 
1433, *17 (April 12, 2017) (stating replacement-cost policies run the risk of allowing 
the insured to be in a better position he was in before the loss and that a reasonable 
match under the relevant replacement-cost policy entitled the insured to skim-
coating, which provided visually matching stucco). 
55 Cedar Bluff Townhome Condo. Ass’n v. Am. Family Mut. Inc. Co., 857 




 Id. at 292 
58
 Id. at 295. 
59
 Id. at 296. 
60




 Id. at 530. 
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interpreted the phrase “equivalent construction and use” as the 
replacement-cost policy calling for replacement “equal in value” and 
“virtually identical.”63 It seemed obvious to the court that if the 
insured were left with mismatched siding, then the insured’s property 
value would have been reduced.64 To the court, the insurers bore the 
risk that the insured might end up in a better position than he was in 
before the loss: failing to pay anything less than a full replacement of 
the siding on the entire house would violate its contractual 
obligation.65 
In Illinois, phrases such as “of like kind or quality” mean 
“sufficient to restore the [property] to its pre-loss condition.”66 In 
Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., plaintiffs brought suit against 
their insurer for failure to replace damaged vehicle parts with non-
original equipment manufacturer (“non-OEM”) parts, which allegedly 
breached the policy’s coverage to replace damaged property with 
materials of “like kind or quality.”67 According to the plaintiffs, the 
insurer could only satisfy the policy by “requiring the exclusive use in 
repairs of factory-authorized or [original equipment manufacturer] 
parts,” as that was the plaintiffs’ original position. 68 The court, 
however, found that the policy at issue was not breached by providing 
the plaintiffs with non-OEM parts, and that “[c]ommon sense indicates 
that an item that is of ‘like kind and quality’ to another is not that very 
item, but rather is something of ‘like kind and quality’ to it.”69 The 
court supported this statement by pointing to the policy language 
which required the insured to pay for replacements that were “better 
than like kind and quality,” which suggested that non-OEM parts 
could be used and possibly allow the insured to be put in a better 
                                                 
63
 Id. at 532-33. 
64
 Id. at 532. 
65
 See id.  
66 Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 216 Ill. 2d 100, 143 (2005). 
67




 Id. at 140. 
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position than it was originally.70 The court agreed with the insurer that 
the specific replacement with non-OEM parts did not violate the 
policy.71 
Thus, policy language inclusive of “like kind or quality” does not 
impose any specific standard of part quality.72 Insurers also have no 
obligation “to make the property better than it was before”: 
 
[I]f an option is reserved to build or repair and the insurer 
elects to do so, it is bound only to put the insured building in 
substantially the same state as before the loss but is not bound 
to pull down the old walls and rebuild them entirely on 
account of a previously existing defect in the foundation; it is 
enough if, by incorporating what remains of them, the new 
walls are as secure as the old ones were.73 
 
Illinois law is likewise clear that “‘like kind and quality’ means 
‘sufficient to restore the [insured] to its pre-loss condition.’”74 
Replacement-cost policies in Illinois are seen as providing a “make-
whole-remedy,” that “must strive to approximate the situation [the 
insured] would have occupied had the [covered loss] not occurred.”75 
Although a seemingly simple principle, it is sometimes difficult to 
determine what the insured’s pre-loss condition truly was when 
dealing with replacement of rare, unavailable (like in Windridge), or 
special property. 
For example, in FSC Paper Corp. v. Sun Ins. Co., a fire at FSC 
Paper Corporation (“FSC”), the insured’s business, burned more than 
                                                 
70
 Id. at 141. 
71
 Id. at 144. 
72 22A JOHN BORDEAU, ET AL., ILL. LAW AND PRAC. INSURANCE § 392. 
73
 12A STEVEN PLITT, ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 176:4 (3d. ed. 2019). 
74
 Avery, 216 Ill. 2d at 117.  
75
 Windridge of Naperville Condo. Ass’n v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co. 
(“Windridge II”), 932 F.3d 1035, 1039 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting FSC Paper Corp. v. 
Sun Insurance Co. of New York, 744 F.2d 1279, 1283 (7th Cir. 1984)). 
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12,000 tons of newspaper known as “Special Pack.”76 FSC’s insurer, 
Sun Insurance Company of New York (“Sun”) admittedly insured the 
loss of the Special Pack, but disagreed with FSC regarding the 
replacement cost calculation method.77 The relevant policy stated: “In 
case of loss the basis of adjustment for all property covered under this 
policy . . . shall be replacement cost at the time and place of loss. . . 
.”78 FSC argued it was insured for the historical cost of the paper, as it 
was required to continually report to Sun its value of the property that 
was at risk under the policy and FSC had continually based its reports 
on the historical cost of the paper.79  
In FSC, the Seventh Circuit decided that the policy did not 
indicate that reported value limited the replacement, and so, depending 
on the market price, FSC could potentially recover more or less than 
the historical cost, placing the risk on Sun when it issued the policy.80 
The Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its goal stating: “[w]e believe that 
FSC’s recovery must be measured in general by the amount it was 
reasonably required to expend to put itself in the position it would 
have occupied had the fire not occurred,” and as long as FSC made 
commercially reasonable purchases to replace the Special Pack, Sun 
would be responsible to pay for such purchases.81 
Measuring replacement cost can vary according to the specific 
language used in the policy, but as a general matter, courts, like in 
FSC, have focused on finding out the true cost of replacing the 
damaged property—not how the damaged property has been valued in 
reports, or that the replacement is now leaving the insured with 
property which is less in value.82 The replacement cost policy asks: 
                                                 
76








 Id. at 1283. 
81
 Id. 
82 See e.g., Davis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 781 So. 2d 1143, 1144 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 3d Dist. 2001) (Replacement cost was measured by the cost to replace the 
damaged structure on the same premises).  
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“what is the cost to replace the damaged property today?” When PIIC 
issued its replacement-cost policy to Windridge, it committed to 
restore Windridge to its pre-loss condition should any damage occur, 
and when PIIC selected option (2) of the loss payment provision, it 
committed to providing Windridge with the money to go out and 






Typically, property insurance policies allow for an appraisal83 by 
experts if the insurer and the insured cannot agree on the amount of 
loss, and an appraisal award is typically binding absent any 
exceptional circumstances.84 In Windridge, there was certainly much 
debate over the valuation of the siding, and whether matching siding 
was, indeed, as unavailable as Windridge claimed.85 In Windridge, the 
relevant policy included an appraisal provision, which allowed both 
Windridge and PIIC to select their own appraiser for valuation of the 
property constituting the loss where a dispute was present.86 Both 
selected appraisers would then select an umpire, or in the case that the 
selected appraisers could not agree, a judge could be requested to 
make a determination instead.87 The policy then indicated that each 
appraiser would submit their valuation of the property and determine 
the amount of loss, and, “[i]f they fail to agree, they will submit their 
differences to the umpire” where “[a] decision agreed to by any two 
will be binding.”88  
                                                 
83
 An appraisal is “the act of estimating or judging the nature of value of 
something or someone.” Appraisal, DICTIONARY.COM, 
http://dictionary.com/browse.appraisal?s=t (last visited Dec. 7, 2019). 
84
 See Villas at Winding Ridge v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 942 F.3d 824, 
830 (7th Cir. 2019).  
85






 Id.  
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While courts have generally determined that the amount of loss is 
not dependent on a coverage determination, there is some confusion as 
to whether an appraisal can still proceed while coverage issues 
continue to exist.89 Windridge originally brought a motion to compel 
appraisal on three issues: (1) cost to replace the affected building’s 
roof, (2) reimbursement for overhead and profit, and (3) “whether the 
aesthetic mismatch is so significant as to constitute ‘damage’, and if 
so, assess a loss amount.”90 Although the Northern District of Illinois 
viewed the first two issues to be appropriate for appraisal because 
there existed a genuine dispute of loss, the court denied arbitration for 
the third issue.91  
Windridge argued that the interpretation of the third issue was a 
question of causation—did the storm actually cause an aesthetic 
mismatch?92 For them, the cause of loss could not be separated from 
the amount of loss, as the issues were intertwined.93 The district court, 
however, considered this an issue of coverage—was the alleged 
mismatch a “loss” that was covered under the policy?94 The district 
court would not allow Windridge to proceed with the appraisal process 
on this issue until a determination as to coverage was made,95 as such 
was the precedent in Illinois.96  
                                                 
89 See generally Runaway Bay Condo. Ass’n v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Cos., 262 F. 
Supp. 3d 599, 604 (N.D. Ill. 2017).  
90
 Windridge of Naperville Condo. Ass’n v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., 2017 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 10598, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 2017). 
91
 Id. at *11. 
92







96 Runaway Bay, 262 F. Supp. 3d at 603 Full citation (“Thus, the question of 
whether the Policy requires replacement of undamaged property to achieve matching 
is not appropriate for appraisal.”). 
16
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 8
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol15/iss1/8
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                       Volume 15                                          Fall 2019 
 
 
Other states, such as Georgia, also prohibit appraisal on 
“matching” to be done before a determination of coverage is made.97 
The rationale for such process is that appraisals can only resolve 
disputed value, and thus, to unnecessarily expand the scope of liability 
before coverage is determined is premature.98 Minnesota would 
likewise agree that “coverage questions are not for appraisers” and 
while appraisers might participate in evaluating the amount of loss, 
“they may not construe the policy or decide whether the insurer should 
pay.”99 
Ironically, in Windridge, once the district court made a 
determination of coverage, neither party’s counsel actually knew if 
there was matching siding available.100 The only appraisal award, 
which agreed with Windridge’s position that no matching siding was 
available, was submitted before the district court’s opinion.101 After 
ruling in favor of Windridge, the district court, however, specifically 
ordered a second appraisal, apparently unconvinced by the first one.102 
Nevertheless, PIIC seemed to have conceded at oral argument that no 
matching siding was available.103 This admission, coupled with the 
district court’s assumption that no matching siding existed, led the 
Seventh Circuit to assume the same.104 
                                                 
97 See e.g., Lam v. Allstate Indem. Co., 755 S.E.2d 544, 546 (Ga. App. 2014) 
(homeowner could not get an appraisal on matching shingles for roof until coverage 
determination was made).  
98
 See generally id. 
99 Trout Brook S. Condo. Ass’n v. Harleysville Worcester Ins. Co., 995 F. 
Supp. 2d 1035, 1041 (D. Minn. 2014) (internal quotations omitted). 
100
 See Windridge of Naperville Condo. Ass’n v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co. 
(“Windridge II”), 932 F.3d. 1035, 1038 n.1 (7th Cir. 2019). 
101
 Id. 
102 Id.; see also Windridge of Naperville Condo. Ass’n v. Phila. Indem. Ins. 
Co., No. 16 C 3860, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62690, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 13, 2018) 
(“Windridge I”) (“Now that the coverage issue has been resolved, appraisal may 
proceed on the siding issue”). 
103
 Windridge II, 932. F.3d at 1038 n.1. 
104
 See id.  
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However, regardless of whether matching siding was available 
now, PIIC actually indicated that matching siding was available to 
Windridge “for almost a year and a half” after the storm and that 
Windridge was liable for not timely taking action.105 Certainly, these 
facts only further persuaded the Seventh Circuit that if PIIC truly 
wanted to litigate the fact that matching materials were, in fact, 
available, they had ample time to do so.106  
 
 
PART II: ANALYSIS OF WINDRIDGE DECISION 
 
In reaching its conclusion, the Seventh Circuit made a few 
important determinations: (1) the relevant policy language was 
ambiguous, requiring interpretation in the favor of the insured; and (2) 
each building suffered a “direct physical loss,” as that was the only 
way the insured could properly be made whole again.107 Each of these 
determinations will be discussed in detail below. 
 
Dealing with Ambiguous Policy Language 
 
The Windridge decision came to the Seventh Circuit based on 
diversity jurisdiction, and as there was no contest as to choice of law, 
the court properly applied Illinois law, which was the forum state 
law.108 “Under Illinois law, construction of insurance policies is a 
question of law” subject to contract interpretation principles.109 
                                                 
105
 Id. at 1042 n.6. 
106
 See id. 
107
 See id. at 1042. 
108 Id. at 1035; see also Santa’s Best Craft, LLC v. St. Paul Fire and Marine 
Ins. Co., 611 F.3d 339, 345 (7th Cir. 2010) (applying forum state substantive law 
and federal procedural law in light of Erie doctrine because no party raised a choice 
of law issue). 
109 Keystone Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Emp’r Ins. Co. of Wausau, 456 F.3d 758, 
762 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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Similarly to how other court evaluate contracts, Illinois courts 
scrutinize insurance policies according to the policy language.110 
Unlike contract law, however, the remedies available to policyholders 
in insurance contexts are often thought to be narrower.111 Scholars 
have indicated that policyholders often lack the resources and time to 
challenge denials of coverage and end up experiencing greater 
economic losses.112 After all, “breaching insurance policies are 
incredibly profitable for insurance companies” and this fact alone 
raises concern regarding whether the insurance policy sold to the 
policyholder is the same policy the policyholder thought he 
purchased.113 
In an effort to alleviate this concern, the contra proferentem 
rationale was born. The contra proferentem doctrine interprets 
ambiguously drafted provisions against the drafter.114 Since the drafter 
has the power to phrase the policy, he should carry the burden of 
making the provisions understandable.115 Insureds and courts both 
benefit from incentivizing drafters to write understandable policies. 
Illinois courts have also justified the use of this doctrine by 
highlighting the purpose of insurance policies—to provide coverage to 
the insured.116 Where insureds are thought to have reduced bargaining 
power, Illinois law provides an equitable remedy, as “[a]mbiguous 
terms are construed strictly against the drafter of the policy and in 
favor of coverage.”117 Essentially, this well-known doctrine seeks to 
                                                 
110
 See Westfield Ins. Co. v. Vandenberg, 796 F.3d 773, 777-78 (7th Cir. 2015) 




Eugene R. Anderson & James J. Fournier, Why Courts Enforce Insurance 
Policyholders’ Objectively Reasonable Expectations, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 335, 337 
(date) 
113
 Id.  
114 Phillips v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 302, 306 (7th Cir. 1992). 
115
 Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous 
Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105, 1121 (2006). 
116
 Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 119 (1992). 
117 Id. 
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“meet the ends of justice” without doing any “violence to the words 
used.”118 
In Windridge, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged Illinois’ use of 
the doctrine, although it did not name the doctrine in its opinion.119 
However, before applying the doctrine, the Seventh Circuit needed to 
establish whether the policy language was, indeed, ambiguous. The 
Seventh Circuit recognized that Illinois courts will consider the policy 
ambiguous if such language is “subject to more than one reasonable 
interpretation.”120 The potential ambiguous terms identified by the 
Seventh Circuit were the phrases “direct, physical loss” and “covered 
property.”121  
Ironically, the potentially ambiguous phrases were actually 
somewhat defined in the policy, but unfortunately, even the policy 
definitions were vague and not without their own ambiguities.122 
Indeed, insurers like PIIC generally provide a “Building and Personal 
Property Coverage Form” to specifically narrow the term’s meaning to 
the specific addresses listed in such form. According to the policy, 
“covered property” included Windridge’s “buildings and structures,” 
but whether that definition included the siding on the entire building or 
the individual sides of the building the court was yet to decide.123 
                                                 
118
 See Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Kearney, 180 U.S. 132, 138 
(1901) (in reading an ambiguous policy in favor of the insured, the Court merely 
states it “interprets the contract so as to do no violence to the words used and yet to 
meet the ends of justice.”). 
119 “Regardless, the unit of covered property to consider under the policy (each 
panel of siding vs. each side vs. the buildings as a whole) is ambiguous as applied to 
these facts, so under Illinois law, we favor the interpretation that leads to coverage.” 
Windridge of Naperville Condo. Ass’n v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co. (“Windridge 
II”), 932 F.3d 1035, 1040 (7th Cir. 2019).  
120
 Id. at 1039. 
121
 Although according to Illinois law, “the mere failure to define a term in the 
policy does not render that term ambiguous.” Id. 
122
 Id. at 1039-40. 
123
 See id. 
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Ironically, PIIC’s attempt to define such language seemed to make the 
language even more ambiguous.124  
As Windridge had pointed out, “[r]eplacement cost policies 
generally charge higher premiums in exchange for agreeing to repair 
or replace with material of like kind and quality,”125 and interpreting 
the policy any other way would deprive Windridge of its “contractual 
indemnity right.”126 Although PIIC previously asserted that Windridge 
was a “sophisticated party” that perhaps could not attempt to rely on 
the ambiguity rule in Illinois, PIIC failed to raise this issue in its 
opening brief and presented no evidence to support this contention.127 
Ultimately the Seventh Circuit determined that “direct physical 
loss to covered property” was ambiguous as applied in the case, and 
due to adherence to Illinois law, was bound to favor an interpretation 
that lead to coverage for the insured.128  
 
 
Direct, Physical Loss to Covered Property 
 
After establishing that “direct physical loss to covered property” 
is ambiguous as applied to the facts at hand, the Seventh Circuit in 
Windridge attempted to interpret the phrase itself. Notably, PIIC 
emphasized the phrase’s use of “direct” and “physical” in its argument 
for narrow policy interpretation.129 PIIC argued that even Windridge’s 
own phrasing of the issue before the district court, “[w]hether the 
policy covers the need to make an aesthetic match when only certain 
                                                 
124
 Id. at 1040. 
125
 Id.; Alessi v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 464 S.W.3d 529, 532 (Mo. Ct. App. 
June 23, 2015); see also Westfield Ins. Co. v. Vandenberg, 796 F.3d 773, 778 (7th 
Cir. 2015) (when evaluating policy language, type of insurance and type of risk 
undertaken are important to consider).   
126
 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee (“Windridge Brief”) at 7, Windridge of 
Naperville Condo Ass’n v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., No. 1:18-cv-2103 (7th Cir. Jan. 
31, 2019). 
127
 Id. at 7, n.2. 
128
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parts of the building sustain physical damage and are repaired while 
other parts are not,”130 was a blatant acknowledgment that the policy 
did not require matching.131 According to PIIC, admitting that the 
north and east sides did not sustain physical damage necessarily meant 
that coverage for those sides was not available, because after all, the 
policy only covers direct physical loss to covered property.132 As 
noted by PIIC, Windridge carried the burden of establishing that its 
“loss” fell within coverage, and if Windridge could not present 
evidence that these north and east sides of the buildings experienced a 
direct physical loss, then PIIC was not liable to pay to replace them.133 
PIIC further asserted that Windridge’s demand for aesthetic 
matching was not the kind of physical damage covered by the 
replacement-cost policy.134 PIIC highlighted several cases in the 
Northern District of Illinois that showed such a connection was neither 
“direct” nor “physical.”135 One such case was Mohr v. American 
Automobile Insurance Company136 In Mohr, a hailstorm damaged 
portions of shingles on a unique and expensive cedar roof, and there 
was debate over whether the entire roof should be replaced or whether 
a patchwork effect would be sufficient.137 Ultimately, the court in 
Mohr found that the insured could not prove the entire roof would 
need to be replaced in order to account for the hail damage (only about 
5% of the shingles on the roof were damaged), as the repair job was 
                                                 
130
 Windridge Brief, supra note 126, at 1 (phrasing the issue as whether 
“‘direct physical loss’ to covered property requires an insurer to pay for matching 
replacement materials that is not physically damaged. . . .”) (Emphasis added).  
131
 PIIC Brief, supra note 4, at 9.  
132
 See id.  
133
 Id. at 15 (“the existence of coverage is an essential element of the insured’s 
case and the insured has the burden of proving his loss falls within the terms of his 
policy.”) (quoting St. Michael’s Orthodox Catholic Church v. Preferred Risk Mut. 
Ins. Co., 146 Ill. App. 3d 107, 113 (1st Dist. 1986)). 
134
 PIIC Brief, supra note 4, at 15. 
135
 Id. at 16. 
136
 No. 01 C 3229, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4772, at *2-4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 
2004).  
137
 Id. at *42-43. 
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not so complex to make complete replacement necessary and the 
“contract [did] not contemplate aesthetic perfection. . . .”138 PIIC 
argued that Windridge’s desire for aesthetic matching was likewise not 
contemplated in the relevant insurance policy.139  
For PIIC, Windridge’s interpretation “would be unduly 
burdensome” as well.140 If required to replace all the siding on all of 
Windridge’s buildings, PIIC questioned if they would be required to 
do the same if only one of Windridge’s buildings sustained siding 
damage—they had, after all, a total of 110 buildings.141 Essentially, 
PIIC wondered if all the buildings’ siding would have to be replaced if 
only one building’s siding was damaged and could not perfectly match 
the others. There was also strong concern on PIIC’s part about 
extending a “windfall profit” to Windridge—presumably the 
undamaged siding on the buildings was weathered and older (since it 
was no longer available) at least to some extent, and such a 
replacement principle was feared to be never-ending in application.142 
Windridge, on the other hand, addressed PIIC’s concerns with an 
argument that ultimately was endorsed by the Seventh Circuit and 
became the pinnacle of the decision itself—the direct physical loss 
from the hailstorm did not occur just to the siding pieces individually 
damaged, but rather, the direct physical loss occurred to the building 
as a whole.143 As eloquently stated by the District Court, “[w]hile it 
would be correct as a matter of ordinary usage to say that the storm 
damaged the siding on the building’s south and west elevations, it 
would be just as correct to say that the storm damaged the building’s 
siding period.”144 To Windridge, if the buildings, as a whole, were 
                                                 
138
 Id. at *47. 
139
 PIIC Brief, supra note 4, at 21.  
140
 See also Woods Apartments, LLC v. United States Fire Insurance Co., No. 
3:11-cv-00041, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105582 (W.D. Ky. July 29, 2013).  
141




 Windridge Brief, supra note 126, at 5. 
144
 Windridge of Naperville Condo. Ass’n v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co., 
(“Windridge I”), No. 16 C 3860, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62690, at *10 (N.D. Ill. 
April 13, 2018).  
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listed as “covered property,” then any damage to the siding necessarily 
affected a direct physical loss to covered property and thus should be 
covered by the policy—to break coverage into applying to specific 
parts of the buildings, especially when dealing with different sides of 
buildings, seemed utterly illogical.145 
PIIC fully admitted that the south and west sides experienced a 
direct physical loss,146 and, indeed, it paid $2.1 million for the 
replacement damaged elevations, suggesting an implicit admission that 
the policy at least covered more than just individually damaged pieces 
of siding.147 This payment, then, at least covered some aesthetic 
appearance. In other words, at the very least, a physical loss to siding 
pieces affected the physical appearance of the entire elevation. 
Windridge noted several cases in Illinois which also suggested 
that physical alteration of buildings’ appearances equated a physical 
injury.148 In its brief, Windridge pointed to cases such as Travelers 
Insurance Company v. Eljer Manufacturing, Incorporated,149 which 
indicated that “‘physical injury’ unambiguously connotes damage to 
tangible property causing an alteration in appearance, shape, color or 
in other material dimension.”150 Certainly, physical injuries to 
property, while often impacting the usefulness of it, also tend to result 
in a change in appearance.151 In the words of the district court, a 
failure to replace all of the sides of the buildings would leave 
Windridge with buildings “suffering from a glaring and profound 
flaw.”152 
                                                 
145
 Windridge Brief, supra note 126, at 1. 
146
 Windridge of Naperville Condo. Ass’n v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co. 
(“Windridge II”), 932 F.3d 1035,1038 (7th. Cir. 2019). 
147
 See id. at 1037. 
148
 Windridge Brief, supra note 126, at 11. 
149
 757 N.E.2d 481, 502 (Ill. 2001). 
150
 Windridge Brief, supra note 126, at 11. 
151
 See Windridge II, 932 F.3d at 1041 (“The storm altered the appearance of 
the buildings such that they were damaged.”). 
152 Windridge of Naperville Condo. Ass’n v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co., 
(“Windridge I”), No. 16 C 3860, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62690, at *10 (N.D. Ill. 
April 13, 2018). 
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The Seventh Circuit agreed that “the crux of the issue seems to be 
whether this policy’s coverage of damaged property refers to the 
smallest unit possible (an individual panel, a single shingle, a single 
patch of flooring) or to one larger (the entire façade, the whole roof, a 
continuous stretch of flooring).”153 National Presbyterian Church, 
Incorporated v. GuideOne Mutual Insurance Company154 appealed to 
the Seventh Circuit as on-point authority in aesthetic mismatch cases, 
as the cases that PIIC cited to involved slightly different policy 
language or had not determined that no materials were available to 
effectuate a “match.”155 In National Presbyterian, the coverage, 
valuation, and loss payment provisions were nearly identical.156 The 
court in National Presbyterian ultimately determined that, although 
only some of the church’s exterior limestone panels were damaged, 
the insurer was required to replace all of the limestone panels to ensure 
matching.157 Since the Seventh Circuit, like the court in National 
Presbyterian, had already found the replacement-cost policy at issue to 
be ambiguous, they were looking for a way to interpret the policy as 
providing complete coverage.158 Thus, interpreting the policy as 
covering the buildings “as a whole” seemed the best interpretation.  
Ultimately, much like the District Court had observed, the 
Seventh Circuit recognized that “a replacement cost policy, by 
definition provides a ‘make-whole’ remedy” and therefore, this 
particular replacement-cost policy “must strive to approximate the 
situation [Windridge] would have occupied had [the hailstorm] not 
occurred.”159 The Seventh Circuit noted Windridge’s buildings all had 
matching siding before disaster struck, and they only wished now to 
                                                 
153
 Windridge II, 932 F.3d at 1040.  
154
 82 F. Supp. 3d 55, 57-58 (D.D.C. 2015).  
155






 See id. (“We face essentially the same issue under the same language and 
arrive at the same result.”). 
159
 Windridge Brief, supra note 126, at 10. 
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have matching siding after disaster struck.160 “Having mismatched 
siding on its buildings would not leave Windridge in the same position 
it was in before the loss.”161 Certainly, this interpretation was 
“common sense” to the court.162  If “no matching replacement siding is 




Commentary on Making the Insured “Whole” Again 
 
In recent years, the Seventh Circuit’s position in the Windridge 
opinion is somewhat of a popular one, albeit derived using standard 
contract interpretation principles.164 Through its logical decision, the 
Seventh Circuit correctly recognized the need for property insurers to 
make clearer the boundaries of their coverage, but it also recognized 
the important relationship that aesthetics have had upon property 
value. 
Aesthetics,165 to be sure, is a subjective idea that is difficult for 
courts to logically explain, as philosophers, architects, and particularly 
legal scholars have continually struggled with the significance of 
aesthetics in relationship to its community.166 In the 1800s, Henry 
                                                 
160




 Id. at 1041. 
163
 Id. at 1042. 
164
 Considering the states that do discuss “matching” regarding relevant 
property insurance provisions, most courts have taken the position that matching is 
required. See Windridge II, 932 F.3d at 1040. 
165
 Aesthetics is defined as “relating to the beautiful as distinguished from the 
merely pleasing, the moral, and especially the useful and utilitarian.” Aesthetics, 
WEBSTER’S NEW THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, http://merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/aesthetics (last visited Dec. 8, 2019). 
166 Randall J. Cude, Beauty and the Well-Drawn Ordinance: Avoiding 
Vagueness and Overbreath Challenges to Municipal Aesthetic Regulations, 6 J.L. & 
POL’Y 853, 853 (1998). 
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David Thoreau wrote about the importance of beauty in relation to 
neighborhood value: 
 
Shall that dirty roll of bunting in the gun-house be all the 
colors a village can display? A village is not complete unless 
it have these trees to mark the season in it . . . A village that 
has them not will not be found to work well. It has a screw 
loose, and essential part is wanting . . . A village needs these 
innocent stimulants of bright and cheering prospects to keep 
off melancholy and superstition.167 
 
As Thoreau pointed out long ago, aesthetics impact society in the 
sense that it invokes happiness, an appreciation for change, a desire for 
harmony or symmetry, and even an inspiration to create.168 Aesthetics, 
then, is something valuable and worth protecting because of its ability 
to positively impact communities in these ways and, perhaps further, 
give citizens more to enjoy and live for. 
Illinois courts view aesthetics as an “element of the public health 
safety, and welfare.”169 Other courts, too, have recognized aesthetic 
value when posed with questions of design law or when asked to strike 
down a certain aesthetic regulation, statute, or ordinance, or even in 
recent years when asked to consider if certain aesthetic creations can 
become a form of speech protected under the first amendment.170 
However, regardless of why aesthetics should be protected, the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision recognized that aesthetics do, in fact, affect 
property values.171 
                                                 
167
 Id. 
168 See Nancy Perkins Spyke, The Instrumental Value of Beauty in the Pursuit 
of Justice, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 451, 469 (2006). 
169
 Champaign v. Kroger Co., 88 Ill. App. 3d 498, 510 (4th Dist. 1980). 
170
 See e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. 
Ct. 1719, 1721 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring in part) (agreeing that the defendant’s 
creation of a custom-made wedding cake is an expressive form of free speech 
protected by the first amendment).  
171
 “Early judicial decisions that upheld aesthetic regulations often did so on 
the theory that they preserved property values.” Spkye, supra note 168 at 469. 
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In Berman v. Parker, the Supreme Court recognized the harm of 
an aesthetic nuisance.172 The Court upheld the use of eminent domain 
to remove existing “insanitary or unsightly” buildings and improve the 
relevant community’s overall appearance.173 Justice Douglas, 
recognizing that aesthetics certainly correlate to depreciation in 
property value, wrote: 
 
Miserable and disreputable housing conditions may do more 
than spread disease and crime and immortality. They may 
also suffocate the spirit by reducing the people who live there 
. . .They may also be an ugly sore, a blight on the community 
which robs it of charm, which makes it a place from which 
men turn. . .[T]he concept of public welfare is broad and 
inclusive. . . spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as 
monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to 
determine that the community should be beautiful as well as 
healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as 
carefully patrolled.174 
 
In some ways, Justice Douglas seemed to promote aesthetics as a 
sort of political goal toward which society should strive. Whether 
something is beautiful or not is, after all, a subjective question,175 but a 
question that courts have been asked to answer nonetheless.176 
Consider copyright, trademark, customs, and tax law—these areas of 
law consistently ask judges to evaluate the aesthetic value in an object 
and determine whether it is original, merely functional, protectable, 
                                                 
172
 348 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1954). 
173
 Id. at 33. 
174
 Id. at 32-33. 
175
 See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 505 (1987) (Justice Scalia commenting, 
“[f]or the law courts to decide ‘What is Beauty’ is a novelty even by today’s 
standards.”). 
176 Christine Haight Farley, Judging Art, 79 TUL. L. REV. 805, 813 (2005). 
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taxable, etc.177 Aestheticism is so intertwined in every area of law, and 
it is difficult for judges to avoid questions pertaining to it altogether. 
Insurance law, however, is perhaps an unexpected area of law to 
deal with aestheticism, as it is mostly contract interpretation that 
dominates. But, as Brian Soucek eloquently mentioned in his article, 
Aesthetic Judgment in Law, “[w]hen a house is sold, the contract 
ordinarily does not say, ‘Two thousand dollars has been marked off 
because the house next door is painted fuchsia.’”178 Indeed, it appeared 
to be “common sense” to the Seventh Circuit that Windridge’s 
buildings would face a diminution in value if the siding was not 
replaced on all of the elevations.179 The zebra striping would certainly 
be an eye sore—much like any contract for the sale of a house does 
not bother to say something that seems so inherently obvious—a sort 
of universally agreed trend of “ugliness” deters people away. 
Certainly, “[t]o say that property values in a neighborhood will go 
down if a cemetery is built nearby, or if yard signs, or green exterior 
paint, or Tudor architecture is allowed is to say that potential buyers 
will be aesthetically displeased enough by these choices that their 
interest in living in the neighborhood will diminish.”180 The Seventh 
Circuit merely applied those principles to the situation at hand, and 
thus, replacement of all siding on all elevations of Windridge’s 
buildings was the proper way to make Windridge truly whole again.181 
   
 
PART III: OTHER COURTS’ APPROACHES IN INTERPRETING  
SIMILAR REPLACEMENT-COST POLICY LANGUAGE 
 




 Brian Soucek, Aesthetic Judgment in Law, 69 ALA. L. REV. 381, 416-417 
(2017). 
179
 Windridge of Naperville Condo. Ass’n v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co. 
(“Windridge II”), 932 F.3d 1035, 1042 (7th Cir. 2019). 
180
 Supra note 178 at *417. 
181
 See Windridge II, 932 F.3d at 1042. 
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State courts have consistently been split when addressing 
replacement-cost policy language.182 Recently, however, there has 
been a trend toward interpreting ambiguous provisions to require 
“matching.”183 In an attempt to provide some uniformity to the 
controversy, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
(“NAIC”) drafted a model law, entitled the “Unfair Claims Settlement 
Practices Act” that addresses replacement-cost policy language.184 The 
NAIC Model Rules propose the following regulation for states to 
adopt: 
A. When the policy provides for the adjustment and 
settlement of first party losses based on replacement cost, the 
following shall apply: 
(1) When a loss requires repair or replacement of an item or 
part, any consequential physical damage incurred in making 
such repair or replacement not otherwise excluded by the 
policy, shall be included in the loss. The insured shall not 
have to pay for betterment nor any other cost except for the 
applicable deductible. 
(2) When a loss requires replacement of items and the 
replaced items do not match in quality, color or size, the 
insurer shall replace all items in the area so as to conform to a 
reasonably uniform appearance. This applies to interior and 
exterior losses. The insured shall not bear any cost over the 
applicable deductible, if any.185 
                                                 
182
 Windridge of Naperville Condo. Ass’n v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co. 
(“Windridge I”), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62690, at *7; see Windridge II, 932 F.3d at 
1040. 
183
 Windridge II, 932 F.3d at 1040. 
184
 NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 902-1, § 9 (1997). 
185
 Id. (emphasis added). 
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The purpose of this model regulation was “to set forth minimum 
standards” for the investigation of replacement-cost policy claims; 
however, that did not include providing for a private cause of 
action.186 To this day, most states do not have regulations in which an 
individual homeowner or insured could exercise a private right of 
action under the state’s unfair claims settlement practices act.187 That 
being said, several states have still passed statutes and regulations in 
order to match the NAIC model law, including Alaska, California, 
Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, Ohio, and Vermont.188 Of course, the 
specific requirements for insurers in such regulations vary from state 
to state.  
For example, Alaska, California, and Iowa have adopted the 
“reasonably uniform appearance” language provided by the NAIC 
while other states have provided slightly different wording.189 Ohio, 
however, would replace the relevant language with the phrase 
“reasonably comparable appearance,” which suggests more latitude.190 
In fact, in Ohio, “reasonable comparable appearance” has been 
interpreted to incorporate the idea of “matching within time,” in which 
the insured must present evidence “beyond his mere opinion” that the 
replacement, while not exact, would not result in a “reasonable 
comparable appearance” over time.191 Additionally, the Sixth Circuit, 
applying Ohio law, seemed to suggest the this “reasonable comparable 
appearance” is actually a low threshold for insurers and a high burden 
                                                 
186
 Id. at § 2. 
187
 Id. 
188 See Alaska Admin Code tit. 3 § 26.090; Cal. Code Regs. tit. 10, § 2695.9; 
C.G.S.A. § 38a-316e; F.S.A. § 626.9744; I.C.A. § 191-15.44(1)(b); O.A.C. Ann. § 
3901-1-54(I)(1)(b); Vermont Department of Financial Regulation Reg. I-1979-2 
(Fair Claims Practices). 
189
 See NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 902-1, § 9 
(1997). 
190
 See O.A.C Ann. § 3901-1-54.  
191
 See Zinser v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., CA 2016-08-144, 2017 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 2721 (Ohio Ct. App. July 3, 2017).  
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for insureds.192 In Wright v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, the 
court stated “[A]lthough unweathered shakes would not exactly match 
the color of weathered shakes, the roofer does not claim that 
replacement shakes would not match after weathering naturally. It is 
uncontested that unweathered replacement shakes, after a reasonable 
amount of time, would weather to match the old shakes.”193 For the 
Wright court, without any evidence or expert opinion from the insured, 
to hold otherwise would “create an extreme blanket rule requiring the 
entire replacement of any damaged shake roof.”194 
Other states have chosen to steer away from regulating this matter 
specifically, but rather, choose to rely on general contract principles. 
Arizona, for example, chooses to interpret replacement-cost policy 
language in the realm of the reasonable expectations doctrine.195 “The 
reasonable expectations doctrine relieves an insured from “certain 
clauses of an agreement which he did not negotiate, probably did not 
read, and probably would not have understood had he read 
them.”196 In Trudel v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company, 
the specific policy included a provision indicating that the insurance 
company would not pay to replace undamaged property due to 
mismatch between the new material and the undamaged materials, 
which probably was the insurer’s attempt to be proactive in the 
“matching” litigation world.197 The District of Arizona held that such a 
provision remained susceptible to the reasonable expectations 
doctrine, which ultimately stated that “a contract term is not enforced 
if one party has reason to believe that the other would not have 
asserted to the contract if it had known of that term.”198  
                                                 
192
 See Wright v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 555 F. Appx. 575, 579 (6th Cir. 
2014). 
193




 Trudel v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., No. CV-12-1208-PHX-SMM, 2014 
WL 4053405 (D. Ariz. Aug 15, 2014). 
196 State Farm Fire & Cas. In. Co. v. Grabowski, 214 Ariz. 188, 192 (Ariz. 
App. 2007). 
197
 Trudel, 2014 WL 4053405 at *7. 
198
 Id. at *8. 
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Such an approach is similar to the Seventh Circuit’s alternative 
support for its holding—interpretation of ambiguities should be 
construed in favor of the insured—but goes even farther by honoring 
the intent of the beneficiaries regarding the contract terms even when 
an ambiguity is not officially present.199 The reasonable expectations 
doctrine is perhaps most beneficial for the insured’s position since (1) 
it can be used as a support in a private cause of action and (2) it 
adequately sheds light on the real crux of the issue—did the insured 
know when they took out the replacement-cost policy that they would 
not be receiving full replacement coverage under the circumstances?  
Indiana’s approach toward interpreting the replacement-cost 
policy language in Windridge clarifies a solution to the subjectivism of 
aesthetic mismatch arguments.200 The Indiana Appellate Court in Erie 
Insurance Exchange v. Sams held the insurer was required to fully 
replace undamaged shingles on a roof in order to establish an aesthetic 
match according to the replacement-cost policy only after experts 
testified that the mismatched shingles would, in fact, lower the 
property’s value.201 
States adopting a different analysis from the Seventh Circuit’s 
analysis include Alabama,202 Nebraska,203 and Texas.204 In these 
states, “direct physical loss to covered property” does not necessarily 
mean that if a building is listed as covered property, the building as a 
whole has not experienced a direct physical loss. For example, as 
recently as 2019, the Northern District of Texas found that “physical 
                                                 
199 See Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in 
Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823, 827. 
200
 See Erie Ins. Exch. v. Sams, 20 N.E.3d 182, 190 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). 
201
 Id.  
202 See Graffeo v. State Farm Fire & Cas., Inc., 628 So.2d 790 (Ala. Civ. App. 
1993). 
203
 See Eledge v. Farmers Mut. Home Ins. Co. of Hooper, Nebraska, 571 
N.W.2d 105 (Neb. App. 1997). 
204 See All Saints Catholic Church v. United Nat. Ins. Co., 257 S.W.3d 800 
(Tex. App. 2008). 
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loss” cannot be held to encompass a loss that is not physically 
damaged.205 The court went on to say: 
 
The requirement that the loss be ‘physical,’ given the 
ordinary definition of that term is widely held to exclude 
alleged losses that are intangible or incorporeal, and, thereby, 
to preclude any claim against the property insurer when the 
insured merely suffers a detrimental economic impact 
unaccompanied by a distinct, demonstrable, physical 
alteration of the property.206 
In other words, the insurer would not be required to replace 
admittedly undamaged property.207 And, of course, for the states that 
have not chosen to fully endorse a “matching” regulation, insurers 
may still want to clarify their policies.208 
                                                 
205 Ross v. Hartford Lloyd Ins. Co., No. 4:18-CV-00541-O, 2019 WL 






 The states of Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia, Washington, 
Wisconsin, and Wyoming have not directly addressed “matching” arguments in the 
replacement-cost policy language debate present in Windridge. See below for a list 
of case citations which attempt to tackle the issue in other states, not addressed in 
this paper: 
Colorado:   Hamlet Condo. Ass’n v. Am. Mut. Family Ins. Co., 2016 
  CV 30594 (Co. Dist. Ct., April 12, 2017).  
Georgia:   Lam v. Allstate Indem. Co., 755 S.E.2d 544 (Ga. App. 
  2014) 
Kentucky:   Woods Apts., LLC v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 2013  
  U.S.  Dist. LEXIS 105582 (W.D. Ky. 2013).  
Louisiana:   Holloway v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 290 So.2d 791 
  (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974). 
Minnesota:   Trout Brook S. Condo. Ass’n v. Harleysville Worcester 
  Ins. Co., 995 F. Supp.2d 1035 (D. Minn. 2014).  
Michigan:  Bernert v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 10- 12359, 
  2012 WL 1060089, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 29, 2012). 
Pennsylvania: Enwereji v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 10-CV4967, 
  2011 WL 3240866 (E.D. Pa., July 28, 2011); Greene v. 
34
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PART IV: WINDRIDGE’S IMPACT MOVING FORWARD 
 
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Windridge was, of course, one 
of first impression for the court, as the Illinois Supreme Court had yet 
to address the issue and establish controlling precedent.209 As stated by 
Windridge in their brief, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in this case 
would necessarily be “outcome determinative” and the issue would 
likely continue to “recur in other cases.”210 The Seventh Circuit’s 
decision, reflective of the national trend in such cases,211 most likely 
reflects what the Illinois Supreme Court would have decided and 
established a few good policies moving forward. 
The Seventh Circuit’s decision, in its logical approach to 
determining the specific meaning of certain policy language, promoted 
transparency in property insurance contracting. A common problem in 
insurance policy drafting has been the overabundant use of standard, 
boiler-plate language, which although making perfect sense to 
insurers, leaves policyholders seeking interpretation guidance.212 The 
Supreme Court of Kentucky best identified the prevalent ambiguity 
problems, stating: 
 
                                                                                                                   
  U.S. Auto. Ass’n, 936 A.2d 1178 (Pa.   
  Super. 2007).  
Tennessee:   Hutcherson v. Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. of Columbia,  
  1986 WL 9608 (Tenn. App. Ct., Sept. 3, 1986).  
West Virginia:  D’Annunzio v. Security-Conn. Life Ins. Co., 410  
  S.E.2d 275 (W. Va. 1991).  
209
 See Windridge Brief, supra note 126, at 8. 
210
 Id. at 29. 
211
 See id. at 8 (“the clear trend is to recognize that matching is required with 
replacement-cost policies.”). 
212
 There is a suggestion that insurance policy drafters value boilerplate 
language, not because they necessarily expect to confuse consumers, but because 
they believe that courts will understand it and thus, ironically rely on court precedent 
when asking for support of ambiguous phrases. Boardman, supra note 115, at 1106. 
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Ambiguity and incomprehensibility seem to be the favorite 
tools of the insurance trade in drafting policies. Most are a 
virtually impenetrable thicket of incomprehensible verbosity. 
It seems that insurers generally are attempting to convince the 
customer when selling the policy that everything is covered 
and convince the court when a claim is made that nothing is 
covered. The miracle of it all is that the English language can 
be subjected to such abuse and still remain an instrument of 
communication.213 
 
However, the Seventh Circuit’s decision reflects a fair way to 
interpret such ambiguity, leaving room for insurers to amend their 
contractual insurance policy provisions to reflect what they really want 
to cover, while also, in the meantime, leaving room for insureds to 
find full replacement under their current policy. As many courts have 
acknowledged, absent sophistication of the insured, when the insurer 
has the greater bargaining power, he should also bear the burden of 
clearly defining the policy’s provisions.214 Having the drafters bear 
this burden incentivizes them to write clear policies that ultimately 
benefit insureds and courts alike, as badly drafted insurance policies 
can “increase the price of contracts . . . strain business relationships, 
and sometimes even forfeit the financial security that the insurance 
requirements are meant to obtain for the contracting parties.”215 
Additionally, the more motivation that insurers have to steer away 
from such boiler-plate language, the less likely other insurers will 
suffer for ambiguous policy language. “After all, it is industry standard 
                                                 
213 Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 451 S.W.2d 616, 
622–23 (Ky. 1970). 
214 See e.g., Williams v. Ill. State Scholarship Comm  if this is supposed to 
be “committee” otherwise spell out., 139 Ill. 2d 24, 72 (1990) (“A contractual clause 
that is part of a ‘boilerplate’ agreement . . . has its significance greatly reduced 
because of the inequality in the parties’ bargaining power.”). 
215 Karen Erger, Think Before You Ink: Insurance Matters Find Out How to 
Draft Appropriate, Attainable Insurance Requirements in Contracts and Why 
Consulting the Client’s Insurance Agent Before Putting Pen to Paper Can Help You 
Avoid Trouble, 99 ILL. B.J. 317, 317 (2011). 
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to use the [Insurance Services Office or ISO] forms, not an individual 
decision for which the executive would be held accountable.”216 
Insurance drafters might certainly hesitate to “strik[e] out on [their] 
own,” as this could lead to more exposure to potential liability, but, as 
Michelle Boardman suggested: 
 
The industry that drafts together, sticks together, not just for 
future drafting, but for the pooling of loss data that comes in 
on the first draft. From insurers, therefore, improvement will 
lie not in more individualized innovation, but in more 
industrywide redrafting. What should be discarded in the end 
is not the standardized policy supported by mass actuarial 
data, but those interpretive rules that create perverse 
incentives to retain weak language and create secret 
meaning.217 
 
And yet, one major criticism of the Seventh Circuit’s decision in 
Windridge lies in its failure to define the boundaries of “aesthetic 
matching.” In other words, if we read these general replacement-cost 
policies as providing coverage for aesthetic matching, where do we 
draw the line? 
The Seventh Circuit seemed to only briefly acknowledge this 
concern in a few sentences and a footnote.218 The Seventh Circuit 
indicated that it was “common sense” that “[i]f one shingle at the 
corner of a slate roof is damaged and no matching replacement shingle 
is available, a building owner would not be entitled to an entire new 
roof.”219 In the Seventh Circuit’s hypothetical scenario, Windridge’s 
particular policy would allow PIIC to merely compensate Windridge 
for the minor “decrease in value of the building due to one non-
                                                 
216




 Windridge of Naperville Condo. Ass’n v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co. 
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matching shingle.”220 Perhaps the existence of this option for PIIC led 
the Seventh Circuit to avoid a rabbit hole of hypothetical situations 
inquiring as to where aesthetic matching might end. But although 
brief, the Seventh Circuit was correct in noting that PIIC’s policy 
would not allow Windridge to receive a windfall profit, as the “like 
kind and quality” provision does not entitle the insured to a windfall 
profit.  
First, in Illinois, “like kind and quality” means a restoration to the 
pre-loss condition.221 If the damage to the insured property can be 
easily segregated to a specific area, particularly one with notable 
physical boundaries, then the replacement will be confined to that 
area, as the “building-as-a-whole” type argument by Windridge would 
no longer apply.222  
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit would later illustrate its 
conclusion in Villas at Winding Ridge v. State Farm Fire and Casualty 
Company,223 which it decided just a few months after Windridge.224 In 
that case, the plaintiff asserted that replacing one shingle would 
require replacing all shingles under its replacement-cost policy.225 The 
Seventh Circuit disagreed.226 According to the Seventh Circuit, 
Gutkowski v. Oklahoma Farmers Union Mutual Insurance 
Company,227 which was used as support by the plaintiffs in that case, 
was distinguishable.228 In Gutkowski, complete replacement was 
required because evidence suggested that “replacing the top layer of 
damaged composition shingles would necessarily damage the 




 See Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 216 Ill. 2d 100, 143 (2005). 
222
 See generally CLARK SCHIRLE, Measuring Damage In A Megaloss If “Like 
Kind and Quality” Does Not Exist, in 26 THE BRIEF 31 (2006). 
223
 942 F.3d 824, 833 (7th Cir. 2019). 
224
 While Windridge was decided on August 7, 2019, Villas at Winding Ridge 
was decided on November 8, 2019. See id.; Windridge II, 932 F.3d at 1035. 




 176 P.3d 1232, 1234 (Okla. Civ. App. 2007).  
228
 Villas at Winding Ridge, 942 F.3d at 833.  
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underlying wooden shingles.”229 The plaintiff in Villas at Winding 
Ridge, could not present any such evidence, and therefore the Seventh 
Circuit, quoting its own opinion in Windridge, denied that complete 
replacement of the roof would be necessary in that case.230 Essentially, 
where there is no evidence that a repair or replacement would devalue 
the home, the argument for complete replacement is weak and often 
unwarranted. While a replacement may risk placing insured in a 
slightly better position, it certainly has never been required to put 
them in a better position, and the fact-intensive analysis that considers 
whether or not property value has been reduced is not something that 
courts decide.231 Essentially, the Seventh Circuit recognized the idea 
that, “[t]he psychology of the market place, which assigns a lesser 
value to an adequately and competently repaired [property], has 





Although only time will tell, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in 
Windridge will likely encourage other jurisdictions to follow a 
contractual approach to interpreting similar replacement-cost policy 
language, particularly in the states where courts have yet to directly 
address the issue. While Illinois might still benefit from implementing 
a statutory regulation to provide more clarity to the matter, the 
insured’s private cause of action is strengthened by the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision in Windridge. The Seventh Circuit gave the 
replacement-cost policy phrase “direct physical loss to covered 
property” a fair interpretation, and insurers would be wise to take 
notice—before they meet their match.  
                                                 
229




 See 5 NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY EDITION § 47.05 
(2019). 
232
 See Siegle v. Progressive Consumers Ins. Co., 788 So. 3d 355, 360 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2001). 
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